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This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity 
on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt. We find that family 
control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists 
mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the 
moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception 
of controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to 
alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the 
instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are 
heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder–debtholder relationship in family firms, and 
debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of 
potential agency conflicts in China. 
 
JEL classification: G21; G30; G32; G34 
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Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years a small but growing body of literature (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 
2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul, Guntay, & Lel, 2007; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 
2011) has explored the impact of family ownership on the shareholder–debtholder agency 
cost of debt. In this paper, we focus on one firm-level factor that is well-known to be 
associated with agency conflicts and yet largely ignored in the examination of the impact of 
family ownership on the cost of debt. This particular factor is corporate information opacity, 
which plays a critical role in determining the extent of agency conflicts between shareholders, 
managers, and creditors and in designing the mechanisms to mitigate these conflicts 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Bushman & Smith, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Smith & Warner, 1979). 
Controlling families’ large undiversified equity positions provide the families with 
greater incentives and capacity for both monitoring and expropriating (e.g., Burkart, Panunzi, 
& Shleifer, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This situation can lead 
to family control having either a positive or negative impact on a firm’s cost of debt, 
depending on whether family owners’ entrenchment incentive dominates their alignment 
incentive. However, controlling families’ incentive per se is not directly observable. 
Opaque corporate information leads outside investors to perceive that controlling 
shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors, compared to when information 
is more transparent (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009; Fan & Wong, 2002; Francis, Schipper, 
& Vincent, 2005b; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Wang (2006) 
argues that greater information asymmetry between controlling families and other investors is 
one source of entrenchment for the controlling families. Thus, opaque information deters 
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outside investors from investing in the firms and increases the cost of external financing (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In contrast, more 
transparent information restrains controlling families from opportunistic behavior because 
their appropriation of private benefits is more likely to be detected by outside investors in this 
situation. The preceding analysis thus implies that as corporate information opacity increases, 
either the controlling families’ positive (entrenchment) effect on the cost of debt is intensified 
or the negative (alignment) effect is weakened.  
In this paper, we examine how corporate information opacity affects the impact of 
family control (i.e., the interactive impact of corporate opacity and family control) on the cost 
of external debt financing, using a sample of 3320 firm-year observations of privately (i.e., 
nonstate) controlled but publicly listed firms in China between 2004 and 2010. We follow the 
approach of Anderson et al. (2009) to measure corporate opacity with a comprehensive index 
that consists of four components based on stock trading information and analyst coverage. 
Our univariate statistics and multivariate results show that family firms in China on average 
pay a substantially lower cost of debt relative to nonfamily firms, which we attribute to 
family firms being overall significantly less opaque than nonfamily firms. Our findings 
suggest that for controlling families in China as a whole, their alignment incentive seems to 
dominate their entrenchment incentive. We further find that family control reduces the cost of 
debt only in firms with relatively less opaque information. In the full sample, the interaction 
between family ownership/control and corporate opacity is positive and significant, which 
suggests that the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as 
corporate opacity increases. The results confirm our analysis that corporate opacity plays a 
moderating role in the relationship between family control and the cost of debt.  
Our research design allows us to dig deeper into the drivers of the moderating role of 
corporate opacity. One important feature of the institutional environment in China is the wide 
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regional disparity in economic development and institutional efficiency.1 The cross-region 
disparity in institutional environment allows us to examine whether and how the moderating 
role of firm-level corporate opacity is further influenced by the institutional environment such 
as overall marketization and legal protection of property rights at the province level, which 
affect outside investors’ perception of controlling families’ incentives and capacity to engage 
in expropriation activities (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 
2000). At the same time, because business laws, culture, and social norms are basically the 
same across China, in comparison with multi-country studies, our single-country setting 
enables us to better disentangle the impact of institutional efficiency from that of other 
country-level factors.  
We conjecture that corporate opacity, as an indicator of controlling shareholder’s 
alignment/entrenchment incentives, plays a greater moderating role in the relationship 
between family control and the cost of debt when institutions such as marketization and 
property rights protection are relatively weaker. The empirical evidence supports our 
expectation in that the interaction between family ownership and corporate opacity is 
significant only for firms located in provinces with relatively weaker institutions. The finding 
is consistent with the notion that investors’ perception of expropriation by controlling 
families, which is more severe when external institutions are weaker (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, & Lang, 2002; Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013), motivates creditors to demand more 
                                                 
1 For instance, in a 2006 report the World Bank surveys investment climate of 120 cities (and 12,400 firms) 
across 30 provinces (i.e., all provinces excluding Tibet) in China and finds wide cross-region variation in 
investment climate. For example, per capita GDP in Southeast China averages more than 150% above Central 
and Southwest China. Firms in the 10th percentile of cities (in terms of government intervention and efficiency) 
spend an average 36 days per year interacting with major bureaucracies, compared to 87 days for firms in the 
bottom 10th percentile cities. Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011) largely confirm the inequality in economic and market 
development as well as government efficiency at the province level. 
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transparent information to enable better monitoring. Consequently, the impact of family 
control on the cost of debt is more sensitive to corporate opacity. 
In addition to the disparity in institutional environment, we also consider two other 
factors reportedly related to the controlling shareholders’ alignment/entrenchment incentives. 
Prior studies find that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate outsider 
investors when the divergence of controlling shareholders’ control rights from cash flow 
rights (control-ownership wedge) is larger (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson, La Porta, Shleifer, 
& Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000; Lin et al., 2011) and for Chinese private firms when they are not 
politically connected (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013). Consistent with these findings, we find that 
increasing corporate opacity is more likely to weaken the negative impact of family control 
on debt cost when the controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher; that is, 
when the control-ownership wedge is higher and a firm is not politically connected. 
Our findings are robust to alternative measures of corporate opacity. We use two 
alternative measures in our robustness check, discretionary accruals and external auditor 
identity (i.e., whether the external auditor is a large auditor). Both are well documented in the 
literature as plausible opacity measures (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Francis, 
Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005a) that the management of the firm initiates and has great 
control over. Our findings are also robust to controlling for the endogeneity concerns about 
family ownership and the relationship between information disclosure and cost of capital 
(Nikolaev & van Lent, 2005). We apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach and estimate 
two-stage least squares regressions. Prior studies (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009) find that a firm is more likely to remain family controlled if the name of 
the firm at the time of initial public offering (IPO) contains at least part of the personal 
name(s) of the founder(s) and if a firm has more than one founder from different families; 
however, no evidence suggests that these factors have an impact on a firm’s cost of debt. We 
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therefore use dummy variables of Personal name and Multiple founders as IVs for family 
ownership. We then employ two additional IVs, Personal name*Opacity index and Multiple 
founders*Opacity index, to instrument the interaction between family ownership and 
corporate opacity (i.e., Family ownership*Opacity index), which is also subject to 
endogenous concern (Kelejian, 1971). The results show that our findings are not driven by 
the endogeneity of family control. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, by examining the 
moderating role of corporate opacity  in the relation between family control and debt costs, 
this study reveals that the cost of debt, and to a broader extent the shareholder–debtholder 
agency problem, is more sensitive to corporate opacity in family firms than in nonfamily 
firms. This is particularly relevant for the Chinese market because existing studies focusing 
on Chinese family firms, particularly in the field of the impact of family control on 
shareholder–debtholder conflict, are limited (Cheng, 2014) despite the importance of family 
firms to the overall Chinese economy. The implication from this study that family owners 
should be viewed as a heterogeneous group of blockholders with firm-level difference in the 
relative dominance of the alignment or entrenchment incentives also contributes to the small 
but growing literature about family control on shareholder–debtholder agency problems. 
Second, we identify corporate opacity as a channel through which family firms can 
benefit from a lower cost of debt. More importantly, unlike country-level factors, corporate 
opacity can be influenced by firm-level corporate governance. Anderson et al. (2003) find 
that family firms pay lower costs of debt than nonfamily firms, but they treat all family firms 
universally and do not show the circumstances. Ellul et al. (2007), however, find that family 
firms originating from countries with a high level of investor protection benefit from a lower 
cost of debt than nonfamily firms. However, country-level legal institutions are obviously 
beyond the control of individual firms. We instead focus on firm-level corporate opacity, 
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which is heavily influenced by internal corporate governance (Anderson et al., 2009; Fan & 
Wong, 2002; Francis et al., 2005b; Lang et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003; Wang, 2006). We 
provide clear evidence that the cost of debt in family firms is significantly and positively 
associated with corporate opacity. We further show that the effect of corporate opacity on the 
cost of debt in family firms is more pronounced in an environment with low marketization 
and weak legal protection of property rights, which is exactly the situation in which family 
firms are more likely to experience a higher cost of debt (Ellul et al., 2007). Our study also 
provides important complementary evidence to prior literature that mainly uses data from 
either the United States or multiple countries.  
Third, we generate direct evidence that corporate opacity appears to be substantially 
more important than some other factors examined by prior studies (e.g., control-ownership 
wedge, legal institutions, and a firm’s political connection) in explaining the impact of family 
control on the cost of debt. This finding has important implications for family firms. For 
example, family firms commonly use various control-enhancing mechanisms to exercise 
effective control with a relatively small equity ownership, which results in excess control 
rights over cash flow rights, not only in developing countries but also in developed countries 
such as the United States (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Prior studies find that high control-ownership wedges would cause 
family firms to pay higher costs of debt because of perceived high expropriating potential 
(Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011). But we find that, even with high control-
ownership wedges, family firms can still benefit from lower costs of debt if corporate 
information is relatively less opaque. In other words, family firms do not have to sacrifice 
those important control-enhancing structures to benefit from lower costs of debt. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports our main 
9 
 
empirical results. Section 5 tests the robustness of our results to different opacity measures 
and to various model specifications. Finally, Section 6 sets forth our conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The presence of a dominant and powerful family blockholder reshapes a firm’s 
agency problems (La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The literature so far has 
provided only limited direct theoretical analysis on how controlling families’ unique 
positions and incentives affect their firms’ cost of debt. Furthermore, empirical evidence has 
been inconclusive so far. In this section, we first review pertinent existing studies. We then 
rely on this literature to develop our hypotheses on how corporate information opacity affects 
the impact of family ownership/control on the cost of debt. 
 
2.1. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Family Ownership on Cost of Debt 
 Anderson et al. (2003), using a sample of S&P 500 firms, find that family firms on 
average pay 32 basis points lower than nonfamily firms on debt financing. The authors 
attribute this lower debt cost to families’ interest in their firms’ long-term survival and the 
families’ concern for their reputation, which give them a strong incentive to alleviate agency 
conflict between large shareholders and debtholders. However, the conclusion in Anderson et 
al. (2003) may not be automatically generalizable to China for the following reason.  
The sample firms in Anderson et al. (2003) are based in the United States, which is 
widely considered to have strong investor protection and creditor rights, while China has a 
considerably weaker institutional environment. The literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; 
Lins et al., 2013) has found that the incentive and capacity of controlling shareholders to 
extract private benefits of control largely depend on external investor protection in the 
country in which a firm is located. Controlling families’ concentrated ownership and 
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dominant position may give them both the incentive and capacity to abuse their control and to 
expropriate minority shareholders and creditors (e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al., 2000); however, families’ strong 
interest in the long-term survival of their firms motivates them to take a long-term and low-
risk approach (Achleitner, Gunther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014; Anderson et al., 2003; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). The analysis suggests that, compared to nonfamily blockholders, family 
ownership/control can either exacerbate or alleviate shareholder–debtholder agency conflicts 
and hence increase or reduce debt cost, depending on external institutions. Consistent with 
this view, Ellul et al. (2007) find that family firms in countries with high investor protection 
benefit from lower debt costs, but experience higher debt costs in countries with low investor 
protection.  
 In this paper, we first perform an initial test to determine if family firms have a lower 
cost of debt relative to nonfamily firms in China, a country characterized by overall weak 
investor protection. We then develop our hypotheses about the moderating role of firm-level 
corporate information on the relationship between family control and cost of debt. Finally, we 
hypothesize that the moderating role of corporate opacity is further influenced by controlling 
families’ moral hazard of expropriation, and we then test this hypothesis. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Corporate opacity and the impact of family control on firms’ cost of debt 
 Economic theory suggests that the relative opacity of a firm’s information can affect 
the impact of family control on a firm’s cost of debt. It is well established that accounting and 
financial information can be used to mitigate the agency conflicts between shareholders, 
managers, and creditors (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Smith & Warner, 1979; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). With respect to external debt financing, the literature suggests that 
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corporate information plays two crucial roles in mitigating agency conflicts between 
shareholders, managers, and creditors. 
First, corporate information plays a formal and explicit role in the negotiation and 
setting of debt contracts. Creditors often require that debt contracts include certain clauses 
and covenants that are based on accounting and financial information supplied by the 
borrowing firms (Smith & Warner, 1979; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Transparent corporate 
information not only allows creditors to assess the borrowing firms’ ability to repay the debt, 
but also enables creditors and borrowing firms to design clauses and covenants of debt 
contracts that alleviate potential conflicts between debt-contracting parties. In other words, 
more efficient debt contracts are possible when borrowing firms are committed to a more 
transparent information environment (Armstrong et al., 2010). Therefore, relatively 
transparent corporate information reduces lenders’ demand for monitoring and the extent of 
the bonding mechanism (e.g., clauses and covenants of debt contracts), which in turn lowers 
the costs of debt. 
 With respect to the cost of debt for our sample of Chinese family firms, a second and 
possibly more important role of corporate opacity is in informal debt contracting, especially 
in establishing the reputation of the controlling families and the working relationship between 
borrowing firms and creditors. Although debt contracts between firms and creditors are 
formal and explicit, informal contracts, which often comprise implicit multi-period 
relationships, also play an important role in mitigating agency problems (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The importance of informal debt contracts is even more 
significant in countries with weak formal institutions, where legal enforcement of formal 
contracts is less effective and efficient (Armstrong et al., 2010). Armstrong et al. (2010) 
suggest that informal debt contracts generally rely more on borrowing firms’ commitment to 
transparent information and less on the effectiveness of the regulatory and legal system. 
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Therefore, when family firms have less commitment to transparent information (i.e., when 
corporate information is relatively more opaque), the costs of informal debt contracting (e.g., 
negotiation, design, monitoring, and enforcement) are higher compared to when corporate 
information is less opaque. Consequently, the costs of debt also increase as corporate opacity 
increases. 
 Taken together, the preceding analysis suggests that relatively opaque corporate 
information increases not only the costs of formal debt contracting, but also the costs of 
informal debt contracting. This implies that the relative opacity of corporate information 
affects the impact of family control on the cost of debt. As corporate opacity increases, 
creditors demand higher returns from their investment to at least partially cover higher costs 
of both formal and informal debt contracting. Thus, relatively opaque corporate information 
will weaken the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. Therefore, we state our 
first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: The impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as corporate 
opacity increases. 
 
2.2.2. Dominant shareholder moral hazard and the impact of corporate opacity on the 
relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt 
We have theoretically inferred that family firms’ alignment incentive dominates their 
entrenchment incentive when corporate information is relatively less opaque. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that various important factors have an impact on the relative dominance 
of these two types of incentive, and outside investors will adjust their perception accordingly. 
For example, a large wedge of control rights and cash flow rights may signal that controlling 
shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson 
et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2011; Shleifer and & Vishny, 1997). A weak institutional environment 
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is also likely to foster firms’ expropriation behavior (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 
2000).  
If creditors perceive a higher probability of opportunistic and expropriating behavior 
by controlling families, they have a greater incentive to monitor the controlling families more 
closely in order to protect their investments in the firms. In this process, creditors may 
demand more transparent information and accordingly set debt-contracting terms that are 
more sensitive to the transparency of corporate information. Because corporate information is 
perceived to be more opaque and less credible when controlling families are more likely to 
expropriate outside investors (Leuz et al., 2003), creditors may require higher returns on their 
lending to compensate for the higher risk. However, when controlling families’ perceived 
probability of expropriation is low, creditors are less concerned about being expropriated. 
Therefore, creditors have a lower demand for transparent information, and consequently their 
lending terms, including the required returns, are likely to be less tied to the transparency of 
corporate information. In other words, corporate information opacity matters more when the 
potential agency conflicts between controlling families and creditors are more severe. 
Formally, we state our second hypothesis as 
H2: The impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and 
the cost of debt is stronger when the perceived expropriation potential by controlling 
shareholders is greater. 
 
3. Sample, Data, and Statistics 
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 Our initial sample consists of all privately controlled (i.e., the ultimate largest 
shareholder is neither a state-owned enterprise nor a government agency) nonfinancial A-
share issuing firms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange between 2004 and 2010. Substantial changes in accounting standards occurred in 
2003, and therefore we choose 2004 as our sample beginning year to have consistency in the 
treatment of accounting items used in our analysis. We first exclude firms in which the 
ultimate largest shareholder is a foreign entity and firms that are cross-listed overseas because 
foreign accounting rules may affect the treatment of some accounting items used in this study. 
We then delete observations for the first year of public listing because an IPO may affect at 
least three of the four components of the corporate opacity index used in this study: analyst 
coverage, trading volume, and stock return volatility (Cliff & Denis, 2004; Ellis, 2006; Rajan 
& Servaes, 1997). After we delete observations with missing data, our final sample consists 
of 705 firms and 3320 firm-year observations. 
 We obtain our accounting and financial data from the China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely used databases for research on 
the Chinese stock market. Data used to construct the corporate opacity index is also from 
CSMAR. We winsorize all continuous variables used in the multivariate tests at the 1% and 
99% level to minimize the impact of outliers. 
3.2. Measurement of Variables 
3.2.1. Cost of debt 
 Some prior studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et 
al., 2007) measure the cost of debt as the spread between corporate bond yield and a 
benchmark (e.g., U.S. treasury yield or LIBOR). The corporate bond market, however, is 
underdeveloped in China and many other emerging economies. Therefore, we follow Kim, 
Simunic, Stein, and Yi (2011), Pittman and Fortin (2004), and Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-
Meca (2011) to measure a firm’s cost of debt as its interest expense for the year divided by 
the average short-term and long-term debt during the year. Chinese public firms do not 
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always explicitly disclose interest expense in their income statements; rather they integrate 
interest expense into an accounting item called ‘financial expense’, which includes interest 
expense, interest income, profit and loss on foreign exchanges, and various fees and charges 
by financial institutions. Most firms disclose the breakdown of financial expense in the notes 
to income statements. We therefore manually collect the data of interest expense by checking 
the notes and drop those firm-year observations that do not disclose interest expense either in 
the income statements or in the notes to the income statements.  
 A concern exists, however, that our sample firms may on average be less opaque than 
the overall listed firms, because opaque firms are less likely to disclose detailed information 
about interest expenses and therefore dropped from our sample. We address this concern with 
alternative opaque measures in the robustness tests. 
3.2.2. Key independent variables 
3.2.2.1. Family firms 
Despite the extensive literature on family firms, no universally accepted definition of 
family firms exists (see Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, & Dekker (2014) for an extensive review). 
Because of concentrated ownership in many European and East Asian countries, researchers 
commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest shareholders’ ownership to ensure 
effective control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Fan & Wong, 2002). In this study, we use a 
dummy variable (Family dummy) to denote a family firm if (1) the founder and members of 
the founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm’s 
control rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate 
largest shareholder.2  
                                                 
2 Of our 3320 firm-year observations, 1092 satisfy our definition of family firms. If we relax the definition by 
removing the 20% threshold for control rights, the number of family firms increases to 1210. As an additional 
test, we run all regressions using this alternative definition. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. If 
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In addition to the criteria above, we apply three other rules in defining a family firm, 
given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, unlike in the United States, 
where almost all family firms are in the hands of second or later generations (Ellul et al., 
2007), founders still control the vast majority of publicly listed family firms in China. While 
Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2012) define such firms as entrepreneurial firms, we regard these 
firms as family firms to maintain consistency with most other studies. Second, if a firm is 
established by more than one family, we regard the family with the largest control rights as 
the controlling family. Third, natural persons were not allowed to own or control a business 
until some years after the start of the economic reform in 1979; until then many businesses 
were registered as village and town enterprises (VTEs) even if they were founded and 
controlled by natural persons. These firms were later re-registered as private enterprises when 
new laws permitted the private ownership of business. These firms are regarded as family 
firms if they meet the two criteria of our family firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest 
shareholder with at least 20% control rights). In some other cases, managers of VTEs later 
became the controlling shareholders through management buyouts. We view these firms as 
nonfamily firms even if the controlling shareholders have more than 20% of control rights, to 
be consistent with prior literature (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2009).  
As in prior literature, we also use a continuous variable (Family ownership) to 
measure family ownership, which is the fractional equity ownership of the founding family if 
a firm is classified as a family firm and zero for all nonfamily firms. 
3.2.2.2. Corporate opacity 
                                                                                                                                                        
we remove the second criterion, the number of family firms remains the same. In other words, when the 
founding family holds at least 20% of control rights, no other blockholders hold more than 20% control right. 
This also implies that concentration of equity ownership is even higher in family-controlled firms.  
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 Following Anderson et al. (2009), we develop a corporate opacity index that ranks the 
relative opacity of each firm-year observation. Our corporate opacity index consists of four 
components; namely, trading volume, analyst coverage, proportion of zero-return trading 
days, and stock return volatilities. The intuitions drawn from these corporate information 
opacity proxies are well known. We elaborate on them briefly.  
Investors are more willing to buy or to sell a company’s shares when less information 
asymmetry is present. Thus, trading volume is an inverse proxy for information opacity (Leuz 
& Verrecchia, 2000). We measure trading volume as the average daily number of shares 
traded divided by the average total number of shares outstanding during the year. Financial 
analysts play an important role as informational intermediaries between the firm and the 
market (Lang et al., 2004). The larger the number of financial analysts following a firm, the 
more intensive is the market scrutiny of the firm’s financial information. We measure analyst 
coverage as the natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts following the firm. Our 
third proxy for corporate opacity is the proportion of zero-return trading days over the year. 
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) argue that the incidence of zero daily return is a 
liquidity measure that captures the relative value of information signals to the trading costs. 
They find that the proportion of zero-return trading days for NYSE/AMEX stocks is highly 
correlated to the bid–ask spread, a well-known proxy for information asymmetry. More 
recently Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) suggest that this measure is particularly 
useful for emerging markets where detailed transaction data are often not available and are of 
relatively poor quality. Our final proxy for information opacity is the volatility of daily stock 
returns. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that the level of stock price volatility is 
negatively related to information asymmetries between the firm and investors. We measure 
volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns (dividend adjusted) during the year. 
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To construct the corporate opacity index, we first calculate the four individual 
components of opacity. We next rank each of these four components into deciles, with a 
value of 9 representing the most opaque firms and a value of 0 representing the least opaque 
firms. As a result, we obtain a new set of variables, Rankvolume, Rankanalyst, 
Rankzeroreturn, and Rankvolatility. We then sum these four components and divide the result 
by a factor of 36, which is the maximum possible value. This process yields a corporate 
opacity index that ranges from 0 to 0.9, with higher values indicating greater information 
opacity.  
3.2.3. Control variables 
 Firm characteristics other than ownership structure and corporate opacity may also 
affect a firm’s cost of debt. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Lin et 
al., 2011; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Pittman & Fortin, 2004), we include a set of firm 
characteristics as control variables in our regressions. These control variables are firm size, 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, the ratio of debt to total assets, a dummy variable 
indicating negative equity, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, the ratio of 
operating cash flows to total assets, sales growth, board size, and the ratio of outside directors 
to the total number of directors. Theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of these 
variables on the cost of debt is relatively well known. Detailed descriptions of all variables 
used in this study are provided in Table 1.  
 We also include year and industry dummy variables in our multivariate OLS analyses. 
Industry dummy variables are based on the classification system published by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad industries 
(12 industries if the financial service industry is excluded).  
< Insert Table 1 about here> 
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 report the distribution of family firms and nonfamily 
firms by year and industry, respectively. Panel A shows that the number and percentage of 
family firms rose steadily, except for a small drop in percentage terms between 2005 and 
2006. In 2004, the Chinese government established the Small and Medium Enterprise Board 
(SMEB) under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A large proportion of all IPOs on the SMEB 
were family firms. Family firms represent about 32.9% of all firm-year observations in our 
sample. The percentage of family firms increased to 42.7% as of the end of 2010, from about 
22.5% in 2004. This highlights the importance of studying the impact of family firms on the 
cost of debt. 
<Insert Tables 2 about here> 
Panel B shows that the number and the percentage of family firms varied significantly 
across industries. The manufacturing industry had by far the largest number of family firms, 
reflecting the fact that it also represented the largest industry by the total number of listed 
firms. Also notable was the absence of family firms in the power, gas, and water supply 
industry. This absence is not surprising, given that this highly regulated industry is 
monopolized by newly privatized former state-owned enterprises. 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, broken down by family firms and nonfamily 
firms. Family firms on average pay a significantly lower cost of debt (0.577 percentage points 
or about 10% lower) than nonfamily firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The 
opacity index is 0.427 for family firms and 0.446 for nonfamily firms, with a difference of 
0.019 or about 4.5%, which is also significant at the 1% level.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 Family firms are, on average, significantly larger than nonfamily firms (2.74 billion 
versus 2.14 billion of total assets). Compared with nonfamily firms, family firms have a 
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significantly lower PPE ratio (0.240 versus 0.261), which may imply that family firms invest 
more in R&D. Family firms have a significantly lower debt ratio (0.451 versus 0.665) but a 
higher current ratio (2.105 versus 1.647) relative to nonfamily firms, indicating that family 
firms may prefer a low-risk capital structure. Family firms also have a higher ratio of outside 
directors than nonfamily firms (0.366 versus 0.361). We do not find a significant difference 
in cash flow performance, sales growth, and board size between family and nonfamily firms. 
 To summarize, family firms and nonfamily firms differ significantly in their cost of 
debt and corporate opacity. They also differ in firm size, capital structure, investment, and 
internal corporate governance. We next formally assess how these factors affect the 
difference in the cost of debt between these two groups of firms.  
 
4. Multivariate Results 
4.1. Impact of Family Control on the Cost of Debt  
In Section 2.1, we propose that the negative impact of family ownership on the cost of 
debt documented in Anderson et al. (2003) may not hold for the Chinese market. To test this 
conjecture, we estimate the following ordinary least square regression model, which makes 
our results directly comparable with prior empirical evidence: 
      𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 ( 𝐶𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝐶)        
+ Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 
                                         +Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶  
Equation (1) 
The detailed descriptions of all variables are reported in Table 1.  
Standard errors of the OLS regression results reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 
are corrected for firm-level clustering. The coefficients of Family ownership and Family 
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dummy are -1.480 and -0.377, respectively, and both are statistically different from zero at the 
1% level. The results confirm the univariate differences reported in Table 3 that family 
control is associated with a lower cost of debt. The findings here and in Anderson et al. (2003) 
suggest that family firms have lower costs of debt both in China and the United States, 
despite the immense difference in investor protection and other institutions. However, our 
findings are not consistent with the findings documented in Ellul et al. (2007), which suggests 
that family firms in countries with weak institutions (such as China) experience higher debt 
cost than nonfamily firms-. This inconsistence motivates us to examine other factors (rather 
than country-level institutions) that may affect the impact of family control on the cost of 
debt. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Except for the estimate of the ratio of outside directors, the OLS coefficients of 
control variables (columns 1 and 3) have the predicted signs. Specifically, firms that pay a 
lower cost of debt are larger in size and have lower risk and better performance, compared to 
firms that pay a higher cost of debt. The OLS results, however, do not suggest a significant 
association between the cost of debt and a firm’s growth, board size, and board independence. 
The OLS results for the control variables reported in Table 4 are similar to those in prior 
studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Pittman & Fortin, 2004). 
There is, however, a concern that some firm-specific variables may be omitted, 
causing the OLS results to be biased. Nikolaev and van Lent (2005) suggest that fixed effects 
estimations reduce endogeneity bias. We therefore use a fixed effects model to correct for 
unspecified heteroskedasticity, which takes into account heterogeneity among individual 
firms. The results are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The coefficients of Family 
ownership and Family dummy remain negative and statistically different from zero (albeit 
with lower significances), confirming the OLS results reported in columns 1 and 3. Overall, 
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the results in Table 4 provide evidence that family control on average is associated with 
lower costs of debt in China.  
In all subsequent analyses, for brevity we present only the results using family 
ownership as the key independent variable. Results are similar when we replace family 
ownership with the family control dummy. The constant term and control variables are also 
included in all regressions, but their coefficients are not reported.3  
 
4.2. Impact of Corporate Opacity on the Relationship between Family Control and the Cost 
of Debt  
4.2.1. Primary test of Hypothesis H1 
 The literature finds that entrenched controlling shareholders tend to supply relatively 
more opaque information to outside investors (Anderson et al., 2009; Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Lang et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). We argue that the negative effect of family control on 
the firm’s cost of debt is consequently expected to be weaker when corporate opacity is 
relatively higher. To examine the moderating role of corporate opacity, we carry out two sets 
of tests.  
 We first divide our full sample into two subsamples based on the level of corporate 
opacity. Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the 
sample median. High-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above 
the sample median. For each of these two subsamples, we then rerun our baseline regression 
model described in Equation 1. The results are reported in Table 5. Second, to explicitly 
examine the joint effect of corporate opacity and family control on the cost of debt, we 
estimate the following OLS model as well as the corresponding firm-fixed effects model: 
 
                                                 
3 However, those results are available on request. 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 ( 𝐶𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝐶)
+ 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶  
(𝐶𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝐶 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶) 
          +𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 
                                            +Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶  
                             Equation (2) 
The results for regressions based on Equation 2 are reported in Table 6.  
<Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here> 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the Equation 1 regression results for the subsample 
with relatively low opacity. The coefficient of Family ownership is negative and significant at 
either the 1% level (coef. = -2.061 in column 1) or the 5% level (coef. = -1.037 in column 2). 
The result is similar to that in Table 4 but with larger coefficients. However, the coefficient of 
Family ownership in columns 3 and 4, which represent the relatively more opaque subsample, 
is not only insignificant (albeit with a negative sign), but also smaller than that in columns 1 
and 2. To formally test whether the coefficients of Family ownership in these two subsamples 
differ significantly, we apply the cross-equation restriction tests. The results show that the 
coefficients are significantly different (p-value = 0.003 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.018 
for columns 2 and 4). To appreciate the economic significance of our findings, consider the 
coefficients reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. When corporate opacity is below the 
median (column 1) a one-standard-deviation increase in family ownership (an increase of 
about 18%) reduces debt cost by 0.373 percentage points. However, when corporate opacity 
is above the median (column 3) a one-standard-deviation increase in family ownership (about 
17%) lowers debt cost by only about 0.077 percentage points.  
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The results in Table 5 provide evidence that the negative impact of family ownership 
on the cost of debt is stronger when corporate opacity is relatively low.  
In Equation 2 we extend our baseline model from Equation 1 by adding an interaction 
term between family firm and corporate opacity. Both models in Table 6 show that, as 
expected, the coefficient of the stand-alone Family ownership remains negative and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term Family 
ownership*Opacity index is positive and significant. The opposite signs of these two 
coefficients imply that as corporate opacity increases, the negative impact of family 
ownership on the cost of debt becomes weaker. In other words, the negative impact of family 
ownership on the cost of debt is strongest when corporate opacity equals zero.4  
Taken together, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that when corporate 
opacity is in the lowest decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms have significantly lower 
costs of debt than nonfamily firms. However, as corporate opacity increases, the difference in 
the cost of debt becomes insignificant. These results provide strong support for hypothesis 
H1 that the impact of family control on the cost of debt is affected by corporate opacity. 
Specifically, the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as 
corporate opacity increases. 
4.2.2. Endogeneity of family control  
 One potential endogeneity concern exists regarding our results about the impact of 
family firms on the cost of debt and the moderating role of corporate opacity on such an 
impact. In particular, we explicitly assume the causality running from family control (or 
family ownership) to a lower cost of debt. However, it is also possible that an inverse 
                                                 
4 Recall that in constructing the corporate opacity index, we rank each of the four components into deciles (from 
0 to 9) and divide the sum by 36. Thus, a zero opacity index value does not indicate zero information asymmetry; 
rather, it means each of the four components is in the lowest decile of opacity. 
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causality is present. Specifically, a lower cost of debt indicates better firm performance, 
ceteris paribus. It is intuitive to argue that founding families are more likely to retain control 
when their firms perform well. We address this potential endogeneity issue in this section 
with the IV approach. 
 An appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs to be exogenous 
in the main regressions. Second, the IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable, 
conditional on other covariates. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that family-controlled firms are 
significantly more likely to be bearing the name(s) of the founder(s) at the time of IPO. 
However, we find no reason to believe that the name of a firm at the time of IPO is related to 
its current cost of debt. We follow Fahlenbrach (2009) to define Personal name as a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains at least part of the 
personal name(s) of the founder(s) and zero otherwise. We use Personal name as an IV for 
family control. 
We use a dummy variable concerning multiple founders as another IV for family 
control. Adams et al. (2009) argue that a firm is more likely to remain controlled by one of 
the founders if it was founded by more than one founder. But we find no systematic evidence 
that a firm having more than one founder has a direct effect on its cost of debt. Therefore, 
Multiple founders, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one 
founder (from different families), also serves the purpose of a good IV. 
 In estimating IV regressions, we employ the full sample with interaction terms of 
family ownership and corporate opacity. If family ownership is subject to endogeneity 
concerns, then the interaction of family ownership and opacity index may also be endogenous 
as suggested by Kelejian (1971). Therefore, we follow the practice in Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) and Kim and Lu (2011) to model Family ownership and Family ownership*Opacity 
index as endogenous variables and estimate a two-stage least squares regression model. We 
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use Personal name, Multiple founders, and their interactions with the exogenous variable (i.e., 
Personal name*Opacity index and Multiple founders*Opacity index) as our IVs. In the first 
stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on IVs and control variables. The F-statistics in 
the first stage (unreported but available on request) indicate that the coefficients of the IVs 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level, providing further support for the validity 
of our IVs.  
In the second stage, the predicted values from the first-stage regressions are used as 
key independent variables. Table 7 reports the second-stage regression results with the cost of 
debt as the dependent variable. As can been seen, the coefficients of Family ownership and 
Family ownership*Opacity index have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients in 
Table 6, but with even larger magnitudes. For example, the coefficients of Family ownership 
and Family ownership*Opacity index in column 1 of Table 7 are -6.091 and 8.070, 
respectively, compared to -3.182 and 4.527 in column 1 of Table 6. Thus, the results from the 
IV regressions are consistent with our earlier analyses and support hypothesis H1 that 
corporate opacity weakens the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. This 
finding is robust to controlling for potential endogeneity concerns.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
  
4.3. Controlling Shareholders’ Moral Hazard of Expropriation and the Role of Corporate 
Opacity on the Impact of Family Control on the Cost of Debt  
 In this section, we aim to explore some factors that influence the mechanism through 
which corporate opacity affects the relationship between family control and the cost of debt. 
In particular, we focus on factors that are related to the potential incentives of dominant 
controlling families to expropriate outside investors because such incentives directly impact 
creditors’ demand for transparent corporate information and consequently the sensitivity of 
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the impact of family control on the cost of debt to corporate opacity (refer to our discussion 
in Section 2.2.2). Specifically, we examine how the moderating effect of corporate opacity is 
affected by the following factors: the divergence between controlling families’ control rights 
and cash flow rights (i.e., control-ownership wedge), external institutions (market 
development and property rights protection), and firms’ political connections.  
4.3.1. Control-ownership wedge 
 Previous studies show that for many firms around the world the ultimate largest 
shareholders exercise effective control over the firms with a relatively small equity ownership 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002), resulting in a divergence between the ultimate 
largest shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights. In the presence of the control-
ownership wedge, controlling shareholders have a greater incentive and ability to expropriate 
outside investors, which often causes a firm’s value to be discounted (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Consistent with 
this view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011) find that the cost of debt 
financing is significantly higher for firms with higher control-ownership wedges, especially 
when the ultimate largest shareholders are families. As a result, creditors have a greater 
incentive to monitor firms with higher wedges to ensure their investments are not 
expropriated by the controlling shareholders. Consequently, the impact of family firms on the 
cost of debt is expected to be more sensitive to corporate opacity when the control-ownership 
wedge is high. In other words, the joint effect between family firms and corporate opacity is 
expected to be stronger for firms with a higher wedge. To test this proposition, we divide our 
full sample into low-wedge and high-wedge subsamples. The low-wedge subsample contains 
those firms that have a control-ownership wedge below the sample median; the high-wedge 
subsample contains those firms with a control-ownership wedge above the sample median. 
We repeat the testing in Equation 2 for each subsample. The results are reported in Table 8.  
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<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 In all four model specifications, the coefficient of the stand-alone Family ownership is 
negative and significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate opacity is in the 
lowest decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms have a lower cost of debt than nonfamily 
firms, regardless of the size of control-ownership wedge. This finding seems to differ from 
that of Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011), who find that the positive impact 
of family ownership on the cost of debt becomes significantly stronger as the control-
ownership wedge increases. Our explanation is that for Chinese family firms as a whole, 
controlling families’ alignment effect is so dominant over their entrenchment effect that even 
a high control-ownership wedge does not significantly change the overall negative impact of 
family control on the firms’ cost of debt.  
 However, the interactive impact of family ownership and corporate opacity on the 
cost of debt differs significantly between high-wedge firms and low-wedge firms. In firms 
with high control-ownership wedges (columns 1 and 2), the coefficient of Family 
ownership*Opacity index is positive and significant at the 1% level. By contrast, neither of 
the coefficients of the interaction terms is significant for firms with low control-ownership 
wedges (columns 3 and 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficient of 
Family ownership*Opacity index in the high-wedge subsample is significantly larger than 
that in the low-wedge subsample (p-value = 0.008 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.000 for 
columns 2 and 4). The results in Table 8 therefore support our expectation that the negative 
impact of family ownership on the cost of debt is reduced by corporate opacity. More 
importantly, the reduction is more significant when the controlling shareholders’ control-
ownership wedge is relatively high. 
 We also note that the coefficient of Opacity index is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1% or 5% level when controlling shareholders’ control-ownership 
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wedge is relatively high (columns 1 and 2); but when the control-ownership wedge is 
relatively low, the coefficient is only marginally significant at the 10% level (column 3) or 
insignificant (columns 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficient of Opacity 
index in the high-wedge subsample is significantly larger than that in the low-wedge 
subsample (p-value = 0.024 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.071 for columns 2 and 4). 
These results are consistent with the notion that creditors have a greater demand for 
transparent information when controlling shareholders’ expropriation potential is higher. 
These results also confirm the empirical evidence in some previous studies such as Lin et al. 
(2011). 
4.3.2. Market development and legal protection of property rights 
 The literature argues that institutional development is important in mitigating agency 
conflicts and in curbing private benefits of control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 
2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Recent studies also show that external institutions (legal 
protection of investors in particular) are negatively associated with the cost of debt (Boubakri 
& Ghouma, 2010; Qi, Roth, & Wald, 2010). The analysis in Section 2 of this paper indicates 
that when controlling families are entrenched, corporate information becomes more opaque 
and the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes substantially weaker. 
In this section, we take advantage of the significant variation in economic and legal 
development among China’s diverse regions to test whether the development of institutions 
affects the moderating role of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control 
and the cost of debt. When external institutions are stronger, it is more difficult or more 
costly for controlling families (and more broadly, controlling shareholders) to extract private 
benefits from their control of the firms (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Thus, in regions with 
stronger legal protection and more advanced market development, even controlling families 
with relatively more opaque information find it difficult or costly to take advantage of 
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corporate opacity to expropriate outside investors. In other words, the moderating effect of 
corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and the cost of debt is weaker 
when external institutions are relatively more developed.  
 The testing in this section is based on Fan et al. (2011), who evaluate a wide range of 
economic and institutional factors in China and construct a range of indices to measure these 
factors at the provincial level. The indices were available up to 2009 at the time we were 
developing this paper. Therefore, the sample period is 2004–2009 in this section. We focus 
on two indices obtained from Fan et al. (2011) as proxies for institutional development at the 
provincial level. Market development is an index that measures the overall level of 
marketization of the province in which a firm is headquartered. A higher market development 
index value indicates a higher level of marketization. Property rights protection is an index 
that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is 
headquartered, with a higher index value indicating a higher level of legal protection. As in 
Section 4.3.1, we divide our full sample into two subsamples, based on whether the level of 
market development and property rights protection is below or above the sample median, 
respectively. We report the results in Table 9, with Panel A using market development as the 
proxy for external institution and Panel B using property rights as the proxy for external 
institutions. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
  In the weak-institutions subsample (columns 1 and 2), the coefficients of Family 
ownership*Opacity index are all positive and significant at either the 1% or 5% level, 
indicating that in regions with weak institutions, high corporate opacity significantly weakens 
the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. However, the moderating effect of 
corporate opacity becomes insignificant in regions with relatively strong institutions, which is 
suggested by the smaller and insignificant coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity index in 
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columns 3 and 4. We compare four pairs of coefficients of the interaction term (columns 1 
and 3, and columns 2 and 4 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively) using the cross-equation 
restriction tests. Among them the coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of Panel B differ at the 5% 
level (p-value = 0.014); all other pairs of coefficients differ significantly at the 1% level.  
Taken together, the results in this section support our proposition that the moderating 
effect of corporate opacity is stronger when external institutions are weaker. We also note 
that in all models in Table 9, the stand-alone coefficients of Family ownership are negative 
and significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate opacity is in the lowest 
decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms pay a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms, 
regardless of the strength of external institutions. This finding complements that of Ellul et al. 
(2007), who find that family firms pay a lower (higher) cost of debt than nonfamily firms in 
countries with strong (weak) legal protection of investors. Our results suggest that, apart from 
country-level external institutions, firm-level corporate opacity, also plays an important role 
in explaining the actual impact of family control on the cost of debt.  
Similar to the result in Table 8, the coefficient of the stand-alone Opacity index is 
significantly positive when market development or property rights protection is low (columns 
1 and 2 in Table 9), while the coefficient is generally less significant in situations with 
relatively high market development or strong property rights protection (columns 3 and 4). 
The coefficients of Opacity index in these two subsamples are significantly different 
(columns 1 and 3 in Panel A have the largest p-value = 0.068). The results provide further 
empirical support to our earlier analysis that corporate opacity matters more for the cost of 
debt when controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors. 
4.3.3. Firms’ political connections 
 A number of studies examine the implication of political connection for controlling 
shareholders’ incentives to expropriate outside investors. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 
32 
 
(2006) find that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by governments, 
and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that politically connected firms have preferential 
access to loans from state-owned banks, which may suggest that controlling shareholders at 
politically connected firms are less concerned about outside investors’ negative reaction to 
expropriation. 
However, Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) and Ma, Ma, and Tian (2013) argue that in the 
Chinese context, the primary motivation for private entrepreneurs to establish political 
connections is to overcome the lack of well-functioning markets and market-supporting 
institutions. . Despite the important contribution of the private sector to the overall economy, 
private firms still face differential treatment in many aspects. For example, bank loans 
disproportionately flow to state-owned enterprises even when they are not performing well. 
In addition, private firms are often excluded from government procurements and projects, and 
they are also frequently discriminated against in resource allocation (e.g., land, mines, and 
certain licenses) and in the enforcement of contracts with governments or state-owned 
enterprises (Chen, Li, Su, & Sun, 2011; Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006). Such an imperfect market 
mechanism highlights the importance of political capital and motivates private entrepreneurs 
to enter politics or to establish political connections. 
One of the most important ways for entrepreneurs to establish political connections is 
to become members of either the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the two most important political organizations in 
the Chinese political system. To show the advanced nature of the CPC and the CPPCC, only 
elite entrepreneurs can be chosen as members. Therefore, to establish and to maintain the 
highly valuable and competitive membership of the CPC or the CPPCC, controlling 
shareholders have strong incentives to see their firms continue to perform well. Consistent 
with this view, Ma et al. (2013) find that privately controlled firms with political connection 
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have less tunneling than private firms without political connection. Therefore, following our 
analysis in Section 2.2.2, we expect the interactive impact of family control and corporate 
opacity on the cost of debt to be stronger for firms without political connection.  
 We follow Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) and Ma et al. (2013) in defining a firm as 
politically connected if either the chairman or the CEO of the firm is a current or former 
government official, military officer, or member of the CPC or the CPPCC. We divide our 
full sample into politically connected and nonconnected subsamples and separately test 
Equation 2 for each subsample. The results are reported in Table 10.  
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 report the regression results for firms without political 
connection, while columns 3 and 4 report the results for the connected subsample. Despite the 
seemly big differences in the magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction term Family 
ownership*Opacity index in these two subsamples, cross-equation restriction tests reveal that 
they are not significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.123 for columns 1 and 3; p-
value = 0.487 for columns 2 and 4). However, the coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity 
index is significant for firms without political connection, while the coefficient of the 
interaction terms is insignificant for firms with political connection. Thus, the results in Table 
10 provide marginal support for our expectation that the negative impact of family control on 
the cost of debt is more likely to be reduced by corporate opacity for firms without political 
connection than for firms with political connection. 
In summary, the test results in Section 4.3 show that the moderating effect of 
corporate opacity on the relationship between family firms and the cost of debt is affected by 
the probability (incentive and capacity) of controlling shareholders expropriating outside 
investors. Specifically, the moderating effect of corporate opacity is stronger when the 
controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge is higher, when marketization and legal 
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protection of property rights are weaker, and marginally stronger when firms are not 
politically connected. Overall, the results provide support for hypothesis H2 that corporate 
opacity plays a more important role in the relationship between family control and the cost of 
debt when the moral hazard of dominant shareholders is greater. The results also indicate that 
these three factors appear to be less important than corporate opacity in explaining the impact 
of family control on the cost of debt. 
 
5. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests 
5.1. Robustness Checks Using Alternative Opacity Measures 
 So far in this paper, we have followed Anderson et al. (2009) and used a 
comprehensive index consisting of four components (trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-
return trading days, and stock return volatility) to measure corporate opacity. A concern 
exists, however, that our corporate opacity index is basically a liquidity measure and/or it can 
represent only the inherent information opacity of a firm that is less likely subject to the 
managers’ control. In that case, our inference that family firms can benefit from a lower cost 
of debt by reducing corporate opacity may be questioned. To address this concern, we 
introduce earnings quality as an alternative proxy for information opacity measure. Earnings 
quality is often negatively associated with earnings management that is initiated by managers 
to alter information opacity. Managers have incentives to manage earnings to handle agency 
problems with outside investors.  
We use two earnings quality measures. The first measure is the unsigned (absolute 
value) discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995). Large discretionary accruals indicate low earnings quality and more opaque 
information disclosure. We estimate discretionary accruals using the firm-year–specific 
method (Francis, Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004) and a five-year rolling window. The 
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estimates are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Due to data availability, we can only 
obtain discretionary accruals for 2220 of the initial 3320 firm-year observations. Family firms 
and nonfamily firms account for 485 and 1735 of the reduced sample, respectively.  
Univariate testing shows no significant difference in discretionary accruals between 
family and nonfamily firms (0.068 vs. 0.072, p-value = 0.225), suggesting that family firms 
as a whole have similar earnings quality as nonfamily firms. However, we argue that family 
firms are heterogeneous in their agency problems, which can be reflected in different 
earnings quality among family firms. Thus, we replace opacity index with discretionary 
accruals and rerun the regressions described in Section 4. The results are presented in 
Appendix. As in the main results, we only report results for Family ownership. Results are 
similar when we use the Family dummy. In Table A1, the negative impact of family 
ownership on cost of debt exists only in firms with low discretionary accruals. Results in 
Table A2 show that when discretionary accrual is zero, family controlled firms pay a 
significantly lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms; however, the significant and positive 
coefficient of Family ownership*Discretionary accruals indicates that discretionary accruals 
mitigate the negative impact of family ownership on the cost of debt. The results in Tables 
A3 to A5 suggest that the moderating effect of earnings quality (as a proxy for information 
opacity) is significantly more profound when the perceived expropriation potential by control 
shareholders is greater. Overall, the results are largely consistent with those reported in 
Section 4, thus providing additional support for our hypotheses.  
One notable observation from the results presented in the Appendix is that, except for 
in two models (columns 1 and 5 of Table A4), the coefficient of the stand-alone 
Discretionary accruals is insignificant, suggesting that earnings quality as measured by 
discretionary accruals has no impact on the cost of debt for nonfamily firms. This finding 
seems to be inconsistent with earlier evidence (e.g., Francis et al., 2005b; Sengupta, 1998). 
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One possible explanation is that the overall earnings quality is relatively low for China’s 
listed firms; therefore, creditors discount the information contained in earnings quality when 
making lending decisions. However, the significant coefficient of the interaction term Family 
ownership*Discretionary accruals indicates that earnings quality matters more for family 
firms than for nonfamily firms for the reasons given in Section 2 of this paper. 
Our second measure of earning quality is a dummy variable (Small auditor) denoting 
high corporate opacity if a firm’s annual report is not audited by one of the international Big 
Four or the largest six domestic auditors by revenue.5 Numerous studies find a negative 
association between the quality of external auditors and the opacity of the audited firms’ 
financial information (see Armstrong et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the related 
literature). Untabulated results, which are available on request, suggest that our findings 
remain robust to this alternative measure of corporate opacity. 
5.2. Uniqueness of Family Blockholders and Different Effects of Founder, Non–Founder 
Family, and Outside CEOs 
We have so far provided evidence that family firms enjoy significantly lower costs of 
debt than nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively low, because the family 
blockholders’ alignment effects dominate their entrenchment effects. However, it is possible 
that this finding may also apply to all firms with concentrated blockholders who have a 
relatively dominant position, rather than being limited to family firms.  
 To test whether family owners are different from other types of blockholders, we 
divide all sample firms into three groups, namely firms with family blockholders, firms with 
nonfamily blockholders, and firms without blockholders. We define blockholders as the 
ultimate largest shareholders with at least 20% of control rights (we use 30% as an alternative 
                                                 
5 The international Big Four include Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG, and PwC. The six largest domestic auditors are 
Shanghai Lixin, Xinyong Zhonghe, Yuehua, Daxin, Dahua, and Zhongshen.   
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threshold). Untabulated results indicate that, while a significant difference is present in the 
cost of debt between opaque and transparent family firms, no significant difference exists 
between opaque and transparent firms with nonfamily blockholders and between opaque and 
transparent firms without blockholders. In other words, corporate opacity matters more for 
family firms than for nonfamily firms, in terms of its association with the cost of debt. This 
finding provides further support for our choice of corporate opacity as the moderator in 
examining the relationship between family control and the cost of debt. 
We next classify family firms based on CEO type (i.e., founder, non–founder family, 
or outside CEOs) to investigate the impact of CEO type on the cost debt. Untabulated results 
show that only family firms with founder CEOs enjoy lower costs of debt than nonfamily 
firms. Furthermore, the moderating role of corporate opacity becomes insignificant for family 
firms with founder CEOs. These results indicate that, relative to family firms with family 
member CEOs and outside CEOs, firms with founder CEOs are perceived to have fewer 
agency problems between family blockholders and outside investors (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006); consequently, the cost of debt of founder CEO firms is less sensitive to corporate 
opacity. 
 
5.3. Other Additional Tests 
In our main analyses, we measure a firm’s cost of debt as its interest expense for the 
year divided by the average short-term and long-term debt during the year. As mentioned in 
Section 3.3.1, Chinese public firms often integrate interest expense into an accounting item 
called ‘financial expense’, which includes interest expense, interest income, profit and loss on 
foreign exchanges, and various fees and charges by financial institutions. As a robustness 
check, we use firm-level financial expenses (scaled by total assets), rather than interest 
expenses, as a proxy for the cost of debt. Financial expense is explicitly disclosed by every 
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firm in their annual reports and is directly available from the CSMAR database, which 
minimizes the possibility of mistakes in our manually collecting data from notes to the annual 
reports. As interest expenses generally represent the largest component of a firm’s overall 
financial expenses, we expect similar results to those reported in Section 4. We repeat all 
tests in Table 4 to Table 10 using financial expenses (scaled by total assets) as the dependent 
variable. The results generally confirm our expectation and remain statistically significant. 
Finally, the by-industry distribution of sample firm-year observations (Table 2B) 
shows that family firms are absent from the power, gas, and water production and supply 
industry (industry code D). To control for potential industry effects, we follow Anderson et al. 
(2003) and exclude this industry (34 firm-year observations) from our sample. Our main 
findings remain valid with this new sample, which contains 3286 firm-year observations 
(with all industries containing both family and nonfamily firms).  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 The existing literature provides inconclusive empirical evidence on the impact of 
family control on firms’ cost of debt. Moreover, several studies that examine such an impact 
from a perspective of country-level institutions (e.g., Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et al., 
2007) seem to generate inconsistent results. Therefore, we posit that the impact of family 
control on the cost of debt is affected by certain firm-level factors.  
We find that in China, which is characterized by weak external institutions, family-
controlled firms on average pay significantly lower costs of debt relative to non–family-
controlled firms. We also find that controlling families’ negative impact on the firms’ cost of 
debt is affected by corporate information opacity. Specifically, the negative impact mainly 
exists in relatively less opaque firms; there is no significant difference in the cost of debt 
between family and nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively high. Thus, our 
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findings complement previous studies that find that the impact of family ownership on the 
cost of debt depends on the relative strength of institutions (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007). We 
further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity on the relationship 
between family control and the cost of debt is affected by certain other factors. Specifically, 
the cost of debt of family firms is more sensitive to corporate opacity when the controlling 
shareholders’ control-ownership wedge is higher, when marketization and property rights are 
weaker, and marginally more sensitive when firms are not politically connected.  
Our study has important implications for family firms. Like firms in many other 
emerging markets, listed firms in China overall rely heavily on debt to finance their growth. 
Therefore, identifying factors that influence the impact of family control on the cost of debt is 
especially important in helping family firms, not only in China but also in other emerging 
markets, discover how they can benefit from lower costs of debt. In addition, families in both 
developed and emerging markets commonly control the firms with a relatively small equity 
ownership. Our results show that, when corporate information is relatively transparent, family 
control continues to be negatively associated with the cost of debt, even with a relatively high 
control-ownership wedge. Our findings that the impact of family control on the cost of debt is 
more sensitive to corporate opacity when legal protection of property and market 
development are relatively weaker indicate that transparent information is even more 
valuable to family firms in countries with weak institutions, where, according to Ellul et al. 
(2007), family firms are more likely to experience higher costs of debt.   
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Appendix Robustness checks using unsinged (absolute value) discretionary accruals as a measure of corporate opacity 
 
Table A1. Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample and sub-sample analyses) 
 
Table A2. Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample with interaction term)  
Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 Full sample Low-accruals subsample High-accruals subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











Constant and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 2220 2220 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.414 0.209 0.508 0.221 0.308 
F-stat. 12.02*** 2.89*** 6.68*** 2.31*** 11.22*** 2.27*** 
Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects  
 (1) (2) 
Family ownership -1.246** [0.601] 
-1.549** 
[0.741] 
Family ownership*Discretionary accruals 6.165** [2.563] 
4.492** 
[2.083] 
Discretionary accruals 0.509 [0.395] 
0.007 
[0.985] 
Constant and control variables Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No 
No. of obs. 2220 2220 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207 0.415 
F-stat.  11.97*** 2.57*** 
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 Table A3. Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt  
 
 Table A4. External institutions, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt  
 
  
Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 High-wedge subsample Low-wedge subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1196 1196 1024 1024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235 0.540 0.210 0.321 
F-stat.  18.44*** 2.47*** 30.56*** 3.46*** 
Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 External factor: Market development  External factor: property protection 
 Low-market-development subsample High-market-development subsample Low-property-protection subsample High-property-protection subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 













































Constant and control  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 925 925 948 948 933 933 940 940 
Adjusted R-squared 0.215 0.540 0.345 0.634 0.235 0.542 0.311 0.638 
F-stat. 14.44*** 39.94*** 6.21*** 2.90*** 14.25*** 53.38*** 4.88*** 2.76*** 
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Table A5. Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt 
 
 
Notes: Tables in this appendix present regression results of the impact of family firms on the cost of debt and on the role of discretionary accruals on the relationship between family firms 
and the cost of debt. The regression model for Table A1 is as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶  
And the regression model for Tables A2 to A5 is as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
∗ 𝐷𝑖𝐶𝑂𝑜𝑑𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑜𝐹𝑜𝐹 𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝐶𝑂𝑜𝑑𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑜𝐹𝑜𝐹 𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Higher (absolute) values of discretionary accruals indicate greater corporate opacity. All other variables 
are defined in Table 1. The constant term and control variables are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are 
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 Non-politically-connected subsample Politically-connected subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1430 1430 790 790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.356 0.239 0.652 
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Table 1. Descriptions of main variables used in the analyses 
  
Variable Description 
Dependent variables:  
Cost of debt Interest expense for the year divided by the average of short-term and long-term debt during the year 
Key independent variables:  
Family ownership The fractional equity ownership by the family if a firm is classified as a family firm; zero for all nonfamily firms 
Family dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if both of the conditions are met: (1) the founder and his family members hold at least 20% of the firm’s control rights; and (2) the 
founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. 
Opacity index An opacity index constructed to measure corporate information opacity. The opacity index ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading 
days, and stock return volatility in deciles (from 0 to 9) and divides the sum of the four components by 36, resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 0.9. A higher value 
of opacity index indicates that a firm’s information is more opaque 
Trading volume Average daily number of shares traded during the year divided by the average number of total shares outstanding during the year 
Analyst coverage The number of equity analysts following each firm 
Zero-return days Proportion of zero daily returns over the number of trading days during the year  
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns (dividend-adjusted) during the year 
Borrowing firm characteristics:  
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
PPE Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
Debt ratio The sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets 
Current ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Cash flow Operating cash flow divided by total assets 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets 
Sales growth Total sales revenues in the current year minus total sales revenues in last year divided by total sales revenues in the last year  
Negative equity A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports negative equity; zero otherwise 
Board size  The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board 
Outside directors The number of outside directors divided by total number of board directors 
Wedge  The difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights 
Political connection  A dummy variable that equals 1 if either the Chairman or the CEO is politically connected; zero otherwise 
Institutional variables:  
Market development An index that measures the overall level of marketization in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization. 
Property protection An index that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of legal 
protection. 
Instrumental variables  
Personal name A dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains (part of) personal name(s) related to the founder(s) 
Multiple founders A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder  
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Table 2. Distribution of firm-year observations 
  

























Notes: A firm is defined as a family firm if both of these two conditions are met: (1) the founder and his family members hold at least 20% of the firm’s control rights; and (2) the founding 
family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. 
 
  
Year All firms Family firms Nonfamily firms Percentage of family firms (%) 
2004 334 75 259 22.5 
2005 394 103 291 26.1 
2006 423 105 318 24.8 
2007 456 130 326 28.5 
2008 515 186 329 36.1 
2009 577 228 349 39.5 
2010 621 265 356 42.7 
Total 3320 1092 2228 32.9 
Industry code Industry description All firms Family firms Nonfamily firms Percentage of family firms (%) 
A Agricultural, forestry, livestock & fishery 89 38 51 42.7 
B Mining 24 6 18 25.0 
C Manufacturing 1963 736 1227 37.5 
D Power, gas & water production & supply 34 0 34 0 
E Construction 64 28 36 43.8 
F Transport & storage 33 9 24 27.3 
G Information technology 276 135 141 48.9 
H Wholesale & retail trade 208 21 187 10.1 
J Real estate 316 69 247 21.8 
K Social services 97 15 82 15.5 
L Communication & cultural industry 9 4 5 44.4 
M Comprehensive 207 31 176 15.0 
 Total  3320 1092 2228 32.9 
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Table 3. Means, medians, standard deviations and univariate tests of differences in means and medians between family firms and nonfamily firms 
 
 
Notes: Variables include cost of debt, corporate information opacity index, and borrowing firm characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 1. Significances are based on p-values using 
the two-tailed t-test for mean (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for median). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 All firms Family firms Nonfamily firms Diff. in means Diff. in medians 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(3) – (5) (4) – (6) 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Dependent variables         
Cost of debt (%) 5.705 5.662 5.318 5.202 5.895 5.876 -0.577*** -0.674*** 
Key independent variables         
Family ownership 0.105 0 0.318 0.293 0 0 0.318*** 0.293*** 
Family dummy 0.329 0 1 1 0 0 1.000*** 1.000*** 
Opacity index 0.440 0.450 0.427 0.425 0.446 0.450 -0.019*** -0.025*** 
Other control variables         
Total assets (RMB millions) 2342 1302 2744 1482 2144 1204 600*** 278*** 
Firm size 21.012 20.987 21.245 21.115 20.903 20.906 0.342*** 0.209*** 
PPE 0.254 0.232 0.240 0.224 0.261 0.236 -0.021*** -0.012** 
Debt ratio 0.595 0.502 0.451 0.447 0.665 0.535 -0.214*** -0.088*** 
Current ratio 1.798 1.261 2.105 1.498 1.647 1.155 0.458*** 0.343*** 
Cash flow 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.045 0.044 0.003 0.007 
Sales growth 0.285 0.137 0.277 0.195 0.289 0.105 -0.012 0.090 
ROA 0.028 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.030 0.023 -0.006* -0.001 
Negative equity 0.048 0 0.007 0 0.068 0 -0.061*** 0 
Board size 2.147 2.197 2.142 2.197 2.149 2.197 -0.007 0 
Outside directors 0.363 0.333 0.366 0.333 0.361 0.333 0.005*** 0 
wedge 0.091 0.074 0.074 0.040 0.099 0.087 -0.025*** -0.047*** 
No. of firm-year obs. 3320 1092 2228   
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Table 4. Family firms and the cost of debt 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms. The regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
( 𝐶𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝐶
) + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶  
Columns 1 and 3 use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable:  Cost of debt 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







Family ownership -1.480*** [0.465] 
-1.012** 
[0.507]   
Family dummy   -0.377*** [0.144] 
-0.142** 
[0.071] 































































Year dummies  Yes No Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs.  3320 3320 3320 3320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.333 0.613 0.331 0.612 
F-stat. 18.10*** 3.70*** 17.75*** 3.33*** 
52 
 
Table 5. Family firms and the cost of debt (subsample analyses) 
Notes: This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms, for the low-opacity subsample (columns 1 and 2) and high-opacity subsample (columns 3 to 4). The regression 
model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶  
Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the sample median. High-
opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above the sample median. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported 
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 Dependent variable:  Cost of Debt 
 Low-opacity subsample High-opacity subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Constant and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1779 1779 1541 1541 
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.734 0.368 0.546 
F-stat. 14.95*** 2.95*** 14.48*** 2.63*** 
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Table 6. Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt 
Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶 
Column 1 uses OLS estimation and column 2 uses firm-fixed estimation. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 Dependent variable: Cost of Debt 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) 
Family ownership -3.182*** [1.011] 
-1.634*** 
[0.706] 
Family ownership * Opacity index 4.527** [2.012] 
0.763** 
[0.351] 
Opacity index 1.091** [0.479] 
2.082** 
[0.929] 
Constant and control  variables Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No 
No. of obs. 3320 3320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.339 0.615 
F-stat.  17.54*** 3.79*** 
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Table 7. Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt (instrumental variables estimations)  
 
Notes: This table presents instrumental variable regressions of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity. Column 1 uses OLS estimation 
and column 3 uses firm-fixed estimation. Both the stand-alone Family ownership and the interaction term Family ownership*Opacity index are instrumented. The IVs in the first stage are 
Personal name, Personal name*Opacity index, Multiple founders, and Multiple founders*Opacity index. Personal name is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of 
IPO contains a personal name related to the founder(s). Multiple founders is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder, i.e., founders from different families. All 
other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  
 Dependent variable: Cost of Debt 
 OLS Firm-fixed  effects 
 (1) (2) 
Family ownership  -6.091*** [2.311] 
-9.081*** 
[1.819] 
Family ownership * Opacity index 8.070*** [2.225] 
8.542*** 
[2.841] 
Opacity index 1.593*** [0.418] 
0.723** 
[0.302] 
Log Assets -0.208** [0.096] 
-0.018 
[0.113] 
PPE 2.925*** [0.592] 
2.686*** 
[0.656] 
Debt ratio 0.053** [0.024] 
0.042** 
[0.020] 
Current ratio -0.514*** [0.186] 
-0.150 
[0.107] 
Cash flow -2.287*** [0.589] 
-0.051 
[0.512] 
Sales growth -0.037 [0.057] 
-0.010 
[0.042] 
Negative equity 0.733* [0.395] 
0.092 
[0.329] 
Board size -0.244 [0.337] 
-0.726* 
[0.418] 
Outside directors 1.117 [1.211] 
-1.804* 
[1.006] 
Year and industry dummies Yes No 
No. of obs. 3320 3320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.615 
F-stat.  18.21*** 6.75*** 
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Table 8. Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for the high-wedge subsample and low-wedge 
subsample. The regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶 
Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Wedge is defined as the difference between the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash 
flow rights. High-wedge firms are defined as those for which the control-ownership wedge is above the sample median. Low-wedge firms are defined as those for which the wedge is below 
the sample median. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 Dependent variable: Cost of Debt 
 High-wedge subsample Low-wedge subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1660 1660 1660 1660 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.670 0.359 0.577 
F-stat.  13.10*** 3.92*** 10.57*** 2.41*** 
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Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, subject to market development (Panel A) and 
property protection (Panel B). The regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶 
Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The sample period in this table is 2004–2009, for which the market development index and property 
protection index are available. Market development (property protection) is an index that measures the overall level of marketization (property rights protection) of the province in which a 
 Low-market-development subsample High-market-development subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1346 1346 1353 1353 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.617 0.515 0.751 
F-stat. 9.88*** 21.65*** 14.46*** 2.24*** 
 Low-property-protection subsample High-property-protection subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 1342 1342 1357 1357 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253 0.614 0.457 0.753 
F-stat.  11.34*** 21.35*** 5.91*** 2.55*** 
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firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization (or property protection). High-market-development (High-property-protection) firms are 
defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is above the sample median. Low-market-development (Low-property-protection) 
firms are defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is below the sample median. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 





Table 10. Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt 
  
Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for politically-connected subsample and non-
politically-connected subsample. The regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑖, 𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝐹𝑂𝑖𝐶𝐹 𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝐶 
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝐶𝐹 𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑖𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝐶𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑜𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝐶 
Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Political connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO of the firm is politically connected. All 





 Dependent variable: Cost of Debt 
 Non-politically-connected subsample Politically-connected subsample 
 OLS Firm-fixed effects OLS Firm-fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















Constant and control  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
No. of obs. 2099 2099 1221 1221 
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.583 0.371 0.726 
F-stat.  12.01*** 2.74*** 9.85*** 3.63*** 
